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Abstract: Competition for FDI is intensifying and changing in scope as 
governments of developed and developing countries alike place a higher 
emphasis on the quality rather than on the quantity of FDI. Against the 
backdrop of contemporary international business trends, we argue that shifting 
from quantity to quality in FDI promotion entails a new policy mix and a new 
approach to performance evaluation. We examine the challenges that investment 
promotion agencies targeting quality are confronted with from an intellectual 
capital management perspective, drawing attention to the implications for their 
human, structural and relational capital. This study offers a broad framework 
to better guide FDI policy reform and evaluation.
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1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as investment involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity in 
one economy in an enterprise resident in another economy (UNCTAD, 2005). 
Beyond its direct benefits for host countries as a source of external finance and 
new employment, FDI is increasingly recognized for its contribution to national 
and regional competitiveness. The argument is that FDI enables host countries 
to better access foreign knowledge and markets, as well as to integrate more 
advantageously in the growing international division of labour resulting from the 
expansion and restructuring of corporate value chains. Multinational companies 
(MNC) are progressively fragmenting across regions and countries not only their 
production and sales functions but increasingly also their innovative activities 
such as research and development (R&D) (Jaruzelski and Dehoff, 2008). 
International restructuring in corporate networks has accelerated and 
broadened in scope through rapid technological change, internationalization of 
corporate R&D, shortening of product life cycles, intra-corporate competition, 
increasing knowledge flows within multinational companies, decentralization, 
and other shifts in international business strategies. These international business 
trends call for a more proactive role of policies in linking regions to globalization 
processes.As argued by Lall (2004), contrary to the neoliberal claim for a 
passive type of policy intervention focusing on liberalization and deregulation, 
the case for more proactive kinds of industrial policies has actually become 
stronger given the fast pace of globalization and technological change. In the 
particular case of developing countries, Rasiah (2000) also emphasizes that 
success in attracting FDI and capturing the associated benefits for the domestic 
economy is associated with effective government intervention. According to 
Velde (2001) pro-active and strategic FDI policy interventions affecting the 
dynamic pattern of national comparative advantages are required in order to 
avoid the risk of a low-skill, low-income trap. 
It is against this background that we argue that the focus of FDI policies 
is shifting from quantity (more FDI) to quality (more beneficial FDI). The 
promotion of high quality FDI is consistent with the growing interest in 
innovation policy among developed and developing countries alike, which 
in turn reflects the wider recognition of innovation as the main driver of 
business productivity, regional competitiveness and long term economic 
growth (Verspagen, 2005; Fagerberg, 1994). FDI is often seen as an engine 
for upgrading through innovation (Ernst, 2008; Mytelka and Barclay, 2006; 
Santangelo, 2005). 
But attracting high quality FDI is not an easy task. Competition for high 
quality FDI is increasing as a growing number of countries have adopted 
liberal policies toward FDI and embraced development strategies based on the 
accumulation of scientific and technological knowledge. This also applies to 
emerging countries, for although traditionally they have been responsible for 
the lowest added-value activities in global value chains, some have recently 
demonstrated they can also compete in knowledge-intensive activities such 
as software development, biotechnology or industrial R&D (Bruche, 2009; 
Chaminade and Vang, 2008; Ernst, 2008). Yet many developing economies 
and peripheral regions within developed countries face significant obstacles 
as they lack the absorptive capacity, large market size and specialized clusters 
that MNCs are looking for when deciding where to locate their higher value 
adding activities (Narula and Guimón, 2010).
Establishing an investment promotion agency (IPA) has become the 
most popular institutional approach in strategic FDI promotion across nations 
and regions worldwide, after a widespread growth of this kind of government 
agencies during the 1990s (OECD, 2006). The general purpose of IPAs is 
to increase the international visibility of the country (or region) through 
marketing campaigns and to facilitate the investment process by offering 
tailored services and incentives to foreign corporations, both before and after 
the initial investment. Institutionally, IPAs usually report to the ministries of 
trade, economy or industry, and often have offices abroad and strong links 
with ministries of foreign affairs to facilitate investment promotion overseas. 
Several international organizations have published guidelines to assist 
IPAs in designing successful FDI promotion policies based on international 
best practices, including the OECD Policy Framework for Investment, the 
Investment Promotion Toolkit of the World Bank/MIGA, or the Guidelines for 
Investment Promotion Agencies of UNIDO. Typical activities of IPAs include 
image building, investment generation, expanding linkages between foreign 
investors and domestic suppliers, information dissemination and investment 
facilitation (Wells and Wint, 2000). The positive impact of an IPA can also 
be indirect, through its policy advocacy role. Indeed, IPAs are often the main 
government interlocutor with foreign investors, and therefore they are in a 
unique position to guide policy reform programs toward the dynamic needs 
of MNCs. 
In this paper we hypothesize that competing for high quality FDI entails 
readjustments of existing national policies and, in particular, of the activities 
of IPAs. We first develop a conceptual model to analyze FDI policies based on 
the differentiation between quantity and quality, on the one hand, and between 
FDI attraction and subsidiary development, on the other. We recommend a 
coordinated approach to FDI policies focused on subsidiary development 
and linkage facilitation in order to efficiently compete for high quality FDI. 
Following this discussion, we build upon an intellectual capital framework to 
better address the specific management challenges facing IPAs in the transition 
from targeting quantity to quality. 
2. A Conceptual Framework to Characterize FDI Policies
Competition for FDI has become a universal phenomenon (Harding and 
Javorcikr, 2007). Previously closed economies open up and vie for foreign 
investments while advanced market economies intensify their promotion 
campaigns. The former skeptical attitude toward FDI, prevalent in most 
countries up until the 1980s and manifested in investment restrictions and 
conditionalities, has shifted toward a more investment-friendly view, leading 
to intensified territorial competition for mobile investment at national and 
sub-national levels. 
Traditionally, FDI promotion policies focused primarily on quantity, i.e. 
on maximizing inward investment flows. The quantitative approach emphasizes 
capital accumulation and employment generation. Neoclassical economics 
viewed the benefits of FDI primarily in terms of a stable source of foreign 
financing within the balance of payments. FDI policy prescriptions under the 
Washington Consensus, which encapsulates the conventional wisdom of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, focused on deregulation, liberalization of capital 
flows and privatization of state-owned enterprises (Williamson, 2005). This was 
a key component of development policies in Asia and Latin America (Evans, 
1979; Amsden, 2001; Lall, 1992, 1995) as well as in the transition of Central 
and Eastern Europe during the 1990s (Radosevic and Sadowski, 2004). During 
the 1970s and 1980s some countries, for example India, were already sensitive 
to improving the quality of FDI and imposed specific requirements on foreign 
investors, such as the need to establish a joint-venture with a local firm, to 
engage in local sourcing or to facilitate technology transfer. But integration into 
the world economy and into international institutions such as the WTO meant 
that these kinds of policy instruments became unfeasible, often implying an 
inevitable shift toward a quantitative approach in FDI policy.
The quantitative model is still valid in many developing countries facing 
macroeconomic constraints and high unemployment levels, and has become 
increasingly relevant also in developed countries within the context of the global 
economic crisis that started in 2007. Yet a new approach has clearly emerged 
in the post-Washington Consensus era focusing on the quality rather than the 
quantity of international investment. Recognizing the heterogeneity of FDI, the 
aim is to target the most desirable FDI to meet specific development objectives 
(Enderwick, 2005). Normally, the objective behind the qualitative approach to 
FDI policy is to attract the higher value-adding operations of foreign companies, 
including R&D, business process outsourcing (BPO), headquarter functions, 
as well as high-technology and high-growth industries such as information 
and communication technologies (ICT), biotechnology or nanotechnology. 
Another manifestation of the shift towards quality is the growing attention to 
sustainable FDI, specifically in terms of its contribution to the protection of the 
environment and to the efficient long term management of natural resources. 
Simultaneously, and partly as a result of the shift from quantity to quality, 
FDI promotion policies are evolving from a focus on attracting greenfield FDI 
toward increasing efforts to support the development of already existing foreign 
subsidiaries. The key idea here is that FDI needs to be interpreted not as a 
discrete, single-period flow, but as a multi-period deepening and spreading of 
value-adding activities, not all of which occur as a consequence of new flows 
of foreign capital (Narula and Dunning, 2010). 
The combination of these two dimensions of FDI policy yields a 2×2 
matrix with four different scenarios (Table 1). The upper-left quadrant presents 
a strategy of FDI attraction under the quantitative approach. As discussed above, 
the idea is long-established and straightforward:  to attract as much FDI as 
possible and to generate new jobs. The second scenario, bottom left, consists 
in subsidiary development under the quantitative approach. It focuses on the 
quantitative extension of existing operations, involving the same operations 
and the same expertise in these operations. This would lead to higher number 
of sales, and hence higher tax revenue for the host government. It may also 
lead to higher employment, but not necessarily to industrial and technological 
upgrading. The third scenario, top right, is FDI attraction under the qualitative 
approach. It generally implies attraction of specific high value-adding functions 
or specific sectors. Finally, the bottom right cell represents a strategy of 
subsidiary development under the qualitative approach. It implies support 
to already established subsidiaries in their evolution and upgrading. This 
qualitative development is not equal to growth, since the output and sales of 
a given subsidiary may remain the same or even be reduced as the subsidiary 
upgrades to higher value adding activities. The task of policy makers is more 
complex and implies a multitude of efforts to embed the subsidiary in the 
national innovation system.
Table 1: The FDI Policy Matrix 
Quantitative approach Qualitative approach
FDI attraction Increase of FDI inflows as 
a  r esponse  to  shor t - t e rm 
shortage of capital (balance 
of  payments)  and/or  jobs 
(unemployment). Reliance on 
foreign investment in the process 
of transition, restructuring and 
industrialization.
Attraction of FDI which can result 
in technological upgrading and 
knowledge spillovers. Selective 
targeting of specific business 
functions and industrial sectors. 
Greater attention to sustainability.
Subsidiary 
development
Growth (but not evolution) 
of existing subsidiaries, i.e. 
quantitative extension of existing 
operations, creation of new jobs 
and reinvestment. The objective 
is to increase capital inflows 
and enhance the role of foreign 
subsidiaries in manufacturing, 
employment and exports. 
Upward evolution or functional 
upgrading of existing subsidiaries 
to better contribute to national 
development objectives.  The 
objective is the higher integration of 
subsidiaries both within the national 
innovation system and within global 
innovation networks.
Source: Authors. 
In accordance with the goals and priorities of FDI policy, different 
indicators and targets can be used to measure its success (Table 2 presents 
several possible indicators, but it should be stressed that this list is not 
exhaustive). Conventional thinking on FDI, under the quantitative approach, is 
in terms of financial flows and employment figures. The two most commonly 
used indicators are inward FDI flows (as a percentage of gross fixed capital 
formation) and inward FDI stocks (as a percentage of gross domestic product). 
These statistics are readily available from national statistical offices and from 
various international organizations (the most authoritative publication is the 
World Investment Report by UNCTAD). The role and evolution of subsidiaries 
under the quantitative approach can be measured in terms of their number, 
assets, employment, sales, value added, etc. On the other hand, the indicators 
for the qualitative approach often include the number of FDI projects in targeted 
high value-adding functions and sectors, as well as the number of new jobs 
created for highly-skilled workforces. Clearly, evaluation under the qualitative 
approach is harder, because there are no clearly defined measures and many of 
the impacts such as knowledge creation or industrial upgrading are to a large 
extent intangible in nature. Even more difficult is assessing the capabilities of 
subsidiaries and the evolution of their competences. The evident problem is that 
there is no single methodology. This qualitative assessment requires substantial 
expertise and financial resources, which are not available to many investment 
promotion agencies and national statistical offices. 
Table 2: Selected Indicators to Evaluate FDI Policy
Quantitative approach Qualitative approach
FDI attraction -
-
-
Inward FDI flows (% of 
GFCF)
Number of new FDI projects
Number of new jobs created
-
-
Number of new FDI projects 
in R&D, BPO, headquarters, 
ICT, biotech, etc.
Number of new jobs created 
for  sk i l l ed  workforce , 
researchers, PhD holders, etc.
Subsidiary 
development
-
-
-
-
Inward FDI stock (% of 
GDP)
Number of subsidiaries
Assets of subsidiaries
Employment of subsidiaries
(Domestic) sales of 
subsidiaries
Added-value of subsidiaries
Profits of subsidiaries
-
-
-
-
-
-
R&D expenditures of 
subsidiaries
Employment of skilled 
workforce
Industry-university R&D 
collaborations 
Patent applications by 
subsidiaries
Linkages and contribution 
of subsidiaries to domestic 
clusters
Exports of subsidiaries
Source: Authors. 
These are just a few examples to help illustrate, albeit in a simplified 
manner, the different kind of priorities and performance indicators under the 
different scenarios of FDI policy. As argued by Head (2010) a key challenge is 
to develop and adjust useful performance indicators given the dynamic nature 
of complex evolving problems, where it is often unfeasible to predetermine 
reliable and stable indicators.
It needs to be emphasized that despite our attempts to categorize, these 
scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Instead, the borders between them are 
quite often fuzzy in practice. Even the countries with the strategies most targeted 
toward attracting high quality FDI still encourage other kinds of FDI, since 
they realize that quantity is also beneficial. More importantly, an IPA should not 
focus either on FDI attraction or on subsidiary development. These tasks are 
complementary. The challenge for IPAs is to efficiently diversify their efforts 
throughout the different scenarios. 
However, as we discuss further in the following section, the kind of 
policies aimed at quality are different from those aimed at quantity. This 
apparent tradeoff between quantity and quality implies that governments need 
to better reflect on the most adequate policy mix given each of their country’s 
circumstances. The allocation of resources to the different scenarios in Table 
1 reflects the strategic objectives of an IPA and its choice of policy mix. But 
finding the right balance between quantity and quality in FDI policies is a 
complex task. It entails placing the endowments of the local economy in a 
global context, identifying spaces for matching domestic capacities with the 
dynamics of global supply chains. 
3. Targeting Quality and Subsidiary Development
Policies for the qualitative development of subsidiaries are more complex than 
traditional instruments such as advertisement and incentives which characterize 
the quantitative approach. The focus is on networking and providing tailored 
support services to already existing MNC subsidiaries. IPAs also play a more 
active role in fostering human resources, strengthening research capabilities, 
policies related to intellectual property, competition and innovation policy, etc. 
(Foray, 2006; UNCTAD, 2005). In a way, this is a race to the top (competition 
in asset creation) as opposed to the classical race to the bottom (competition 
based on lower costs and taxes) (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004). 
The stronger focus on subsidiary development is grounded in the fact that 
MNCs normally undertake sequential investments, building higher value-adding 
activities in locations that have displayed competence in other previous activities 
such as manufacturing or sales and marketing, underpinning the importance of 
the duration of operations (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Mudambi and Mudambi 
2005). This implies that high quality FDI may follow after lower quality FDI, 
meaning that quantity and quality should not be seen as contradictory objectives 
but rather as parts of a continuum (Sargent and Matthews, 2009). However such 
a positive evolution is by no means automatic – technological upgrading through 
FDI requires raising local capabilities and absorptive capacity (Kemeny, 2010).
As specialization and segmentation of corporate functions deepens and MNCs 
rationalize their supply chains, existing subsidiaries continuously compete against 
each other for higher value-adding mandates. The location decision depends on the 
response of the different subsidiaries to the needs of headquarters through proposals 
that exploit both subsidiary competencies and location-specific advantages. Thus 
from an evolutionary perspective upgrading is determined by the development of 
subsidiary-specific advantage (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). Simultaneously, the 
geography of corporate value chains is highly influenced by path dependencies and 
inertia reflecting past investment decisions. 
Subsidiary development calls for a regular monitoring of subsidiaries with 
the goal of offering them complementary assistance, adapted to their level of 
development. This requires building and maintaining a network of contacts 
between foreign subsidiaries, governments and domestic firms. This network 
should provide ideas for co-operation, linkages and expansion. Promoting 
linkages and creating clusters around MNC subsidiaries should be a critical part 
of FDI policies. But creating the kind of linkages and clusters around MNCs to 
foster technological upgrading is not straightforward, as it requires institutional 
change and rapidly rising capabilities as wages rise and skill demands change 
(Lall, 2004). The key challenge consists in matching the industrial structure 
and comparative advantages of the region with the kinds of FDI that are being 
attracted. Many of the most successful cases of FDI-assisted upgrading are 
often framed within strategic government intervention, such as for example 
the case of Costa Rica (Box 1).
Box 1: FDI-assisted Upgrading in Costa Rica
Intel’s investment in Costa Rica in the mid-1990s represented the consolidation 
of the national strategy to diversify out of apparel and natural resources toward 
electronics. According to Mortimore and Vergara (2004: 505), Costa Rica took 
advantage of Intel’s announcement of its intention to open a new site in Latin 
America “by designing and implementing a focused, targeted and active FDI policy 
that emphasised the coincidence between Intel’s corporate objectives and Costa 
Rica’s development strategy”. Costa Rica then successfully implemented a new 
development strategy based on attracting FDI to upgrade into more technologically-
sophisticated activities. Substantial success was achieved in electronics, medical 
devices and logistics by way of selective interventions related to improving domestic 
capabilities to attract FDI, implementing an active and targeted FDI policy reflecting 
national developmental priorities, negotiating firm-level packages and deploying 
specific industrial policies to promote productive linkages.
Sources: Mortimore and Vergara (2004); Mytelka and Barclay (2006).
IPAs should focus their limited resources on those foreign subsidiaries 
which are more likely to upgrade in corporate value chains and to create 
domestic linkages. Policies should be sensitive to high heterogeneity in the kinds 
of MNCs, their subsidiaries, and the potential development effects these might 
have. Different kinds of subsidiaries will provide different kinds of potential 
linkage and spillover effects (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2000; Marin and Bell, 
2006; Jindra et al., 2009). Given the heterogeneity of MNC activity, it makes 
sense that policies are fine-tuned to specific industries and clusters in particular 
regions rather than a general, one-size-fits-all approach. 
In sum, targeting quality requires more proactive FDI policies based 
on substantive policy analysis capabilities, in contrast to policies focused on 
quantity which can rely on a more passive approach to government intervention 
focused on deregulation, liberalization, tax reduction and providing a stable 
macroeconomic environment. Policies oriented to the quality of FDI necessarily 
need to consider more closely the kind of national capabilities that need to 
be developed, both to become an attractive destination and to be able to reap 
the potential benefits and synergies associated with this kind of investment. 
The upgrading efforts involve system coordination initiatives to improve the 
education system, infrastructure, institutions, and so forth (Rasiah, 2002, 2009).
The key challenge for policy makers is to design a coherent and efficient 
policy mix that encompasses the right set of policies considering the country’s 
circumstances and developmental strategies. But determining the correct policy 
mix is an extremely difficult task because it involves different government 
departments and agencies and because the relative efficiency of the different 
policy instruments is uncertain ex ante and hard to evaluate ex post. Not only 
are outcomes harder to measure, but it is also often extremely difficult to 
attribute outcomes to underlying policies. Moreover, the policy mix is not a 
static structure – it necessarily changes through time in response to structural 
transformations of markets and technologies and to changes in broader economic 
development strategies. Each individual country would require a different mix 
of policies depending on its technological and institutional profile.
The existing literature finds a positive relationship between investment 
promotion and success in attracting FDI (Harding and Javorcikr, 2007). 
But, clearly, the scope of activities that an agency undertakes influences its 
performance (Morisset, 2003). In particular, IPAs whose activity is limited to 
the provision of information on investment possibilities are unlikely to have 
an impact within the framework of qualitative subsidiary development. An 
increasing number of IPAs offer so-called aftercare services (UNCTAD, 2007), 
i.e. post-investment services aimed at successful running of realized investment 
projects. Along these lines, Brown and Raines (2000) speak of a shift in FDI 
policy since the 1990s, from strategies to attract investment toward those 
designed to securing additional investments from existing investors and deepening 
their impact on the local economy. However, most IPAs still tend to focus most of 
their resources on the attraction of new FDI through pre-investment services, while 
very little is invested in aftercare (Costa and Filippov, 2008; Filippov, 2008; Narula 
and Dunning, 2010). In general, even IPAs explicitly targeting high quality FDI 
often continue focusing on traditional policy instruments and are often evaluated 
based on traditional performance indicators. 
A possible explanation of this paradox is that government inward 
investment policy is subject to competing pressures and long-term as well as 
short-term considerations. Velde (2001) suggests that FDI policies focussing on 
quality are expected to create less employment and more inequality than those 
focussing on quantity, although quality FDI better contributes to human capital 
formation and to technological upgrading. Mudambi and Mudambi (2005) 
argue that policies aimed at maximizing knowledge flows do not contribute 
to reducing regional disparities, since knowledge-intensive subsidiaries will 
gravitate toward the most technologically advanced regions. Moreover, their 
study finds that subsidiary operations with high knowledge flows generate 
lower employment levels, suggesting some extent of quality/quantity tradeoff. 
From a long-term perspective, the focus remains on knowledge-intensive MNC 
subsidiaries that generate larger knowledge inflows and linkages. However, 
in the short term, political cycle considerations often require an emphasis on 
employment generation, particularly in relatively backward areas of a country. 
Indeed, since FDI policy is also subject to short-term political pressures, the 
need for more obvious and easily measurable local benefits, such as headcount 
employment, often drives policy making and evaluation. This argument is 
critical in the current times of global economic crisis where employment and 
capital accumulation return to the top of the policy agenda.
Beyond the investment promotion activities of IPAs, a multitude of 
actors are involved in subsidiary development. These may include regional 
economic development agencies, technology transfer organizations, R&D 
funding agencies, and ministries of economy, technology and innovation. This 
implies that FDI policies need to be closely linked and integrated with industrial 
and innovation policies (Costa and Filippov, 2008; Guimón, 2009; Narula 
and Dunning, 2010). Government policies to attract high quality FDI include 
signaling opportunities to foreign investors and facilitating the investment 
process, but also providing public goods in critical areas such as education and 
science and technology infrastructure. In this context, a key role for IPAs is to 
guide national reform programs toward the factors that MNCs are looking at 
when deciding where to locate their higher quality FDI. 
4. Management Challenges for Investment Promotion Agencies
from an Intellectual Capital Perspective
Building on the previous sections, the objective here is to point out some 
of the main management challenges facing investment promotion agencies 
in the transition from targeting quantity to targeting quality. We do so using 
an intellectual capital framework, drawing attention to the key intangible 
resources and activities that IPAs should develop in order to be efficient in 
their shifting mandate. Intellectual capital can be defined as the combination 
of an organization’s intangible resources and activities.
A variety of intellectual capital management and reporting models have 
emerged since the 1990s to better address the main drivers of innovation 
and value-creation within organizations that are not reflected in traditional 
management control and accounting systems (e.g. Brooking, 1996; Edvinsson 
and Malone, 1997; MERITUM, 2002). Although these were originally 
addressed to the private sector a growing number of government departments 
and agencies have also adopted intellectual capital management tools (Bounfour 
and Edvinsson, 2005; Dalkir et al., 2007; Mouritsen et al., 2004; Wall, 2005). 
This reflects the aim to apply business concepts and frameworks to the public 
sector, which characterizes the so-called new public management movement 
(Williams, 2008).
Thus the attempts to better measure and manage intellectual capital 
represent a departure from traditional accounting and control systems which 
focus on tangible and financial indicators. Intellectual capital is usually classified 
into the following three sources of knowledge-based capital, which constitute 
the key drivers of an organization’s success in achieving its strategic objectives:
• Human capital: The knowledge that employees take with them when
they leave the organization at the end of the working day. It includes the
knowledge, skills, experiences and capabilities of people.
• Structural capital: The knowledge that stays within the organization at the
end of the working day. It comprises organizational routines, procedures,
systems, cultures and databases.
• Relational capital: The knowledge linked to the external relationships
of the organization. It comprises the part of human and structural capital
involved in the company’s relations with stakeholders (including its
owners, customers, suppliers, etc.), plus the perceptions that these hold
about the company (including reputation, brand image, etc.).
4.1 Human Capital 
IPAs’ focus on quality and subsidiary development implies the need for a 
new kind of human capital. The typical activities of the employees of IPAs 
are shifting from administrative and commercial functions toward highly 
specialized and complex functions. Existing employees need training on 
innovation and R&D and, at the same time, new employees with a technological 
background may need to be hired. As inward investment promotion becomes 
more connected with innovation policy, IPAs would need to develop internally 
new skills and capabilities, not only to understand the changing technological 
strategies of multinational enterprises, but also to be able to evaluate the interest 
of incoming FDI projects. 
It is important to stress that the new knowledge and capabilities required are 
not only strictly scientific and technological, but also comprise complementary, 
soft capabilities such as analytical skills, polyvalence and the ability to sense 
and respond to technological and market trends. The new challenges for 
investment promotion agencies also call for more flexible procedures, including 
subcontracting and part-time employment contracts to bring along specialized 
knowledge when needed, including for specific, short-term projects. 
4.2 Structural Capital
Structural capital is related to organizational routines and management 
procedures, tools, systems and databases. It reflects the transformation of 
knowledge embedded in individuals (human capital) into knowledge that 
remains within the organizational structure. This occurs through codification, 
diffusion and standardization. When IPAs shift their strategies from quantity 
to quality, their structural capital needs to evolve through the implementation 
of new processes and service offerings. Indeed, the increased competition for 
high quality FDI often requires an activist policy approach aimed at specific 
foreign investors. As explained by Mudambi and Mudambi (2005), such activist 
policies generally encompass a two-stage strategy – the first stage consists in 
targeting the most appropriate investment projects while the second consists 
in tailoring the most appropriate package of incentives and services for the 
individual firms being considered. 
Presently, many IPAs are developing new screening systems or checklists 
in accordance with this strategy. Targeting quality requires not only a new set 
of performance measurement indicators, as discussed earlier, but also new 
methods to evaluate and screen potential investment projects. The screening of 
FDI projects and potential investors against predefined criteria helps determine 
the extent of public support to provide (in the form of incentives or investment 
services) based on the expected benefits for the host country/region, as illustrated 
by the case of Invest in Spain (Box 2).
Box 2: The Screening System of Investment in Spain 
In 2008 the Spanish investment promotion agency, Invest in Spain, implemented 
a Customer Relationships Management (CRM) model which rates incoming 
projects and existing investors according to four criteria, two quantitative and two 
qualitative. The quantitative are ‘financial investment’ and ‘number of employees’. 
The qualitative are ‘quality of jobs created’ and ‘functional focus of the project’. 
To determine the score in each criterion, a Likert-type scale from one to five is 
used. In ‘functional focus of the project’, the highest score (5) is assigned if it is 
an R&D center or a regional headquarter. In ‘quality of employment’, the highest 
score is assigned if most of the employees will be researchers and PhDs. The final 
rating is based on a weighted average of the four categories, and the qualitative 
indicators have a higher weight than the quantitative ones in the final score. 
Source: Personal interviews with managers of Invest in Spain (Madrid, 2008).
Structural capital is also related to the capacity of an IPA to package new 
service offerings that may be attractive to foreign investors and contribute to 
the upgrading of existing subsidiaries. This entails the explicit design of policy 
instruments, which are offered to foreign investors and which receive a certain 
budget allocation. For example, many IPAs have set up technology linkage 
programs to support the development of supplier networks and technology 
clusters around MNC subsidiaries. Policies may also include subsidies linked to 
performance requirements such as the collaboration between foreign subsidiaries 
and local firms, universities and research centres. Another typical approach is 
to offer research hosting services to foreign firms through technology parks, 
which may include subsidized office space, access to research equipment and 
administrative services. 
4.3 Relational Capital 
Relational capital is a central component of the value creation process of IPAs, 
because their aim is to improve the international image of the country/region, 
to network with existing investors and to imprint a higher responsiveness 
on other government departments and agencies. The shift from quantity to 
quality brings along a different approach to the management of IPAs external 
relationships, both with MNCs and with other spheres of government. It requires 
a stronger steering and coordination capacity, aimed at generating dialogue and 
collaboration at various levels among a wide set of local and foreign actors.
With regard to MNCs, we have argued that targeting quality requires 
a stronger focus on subsidiary development rather than on greenfield FDI 
attraction. Subsidiary development should concentrate on selected groups of 
subsidiaries, following targeting and market segmentation efforts. It is important 
to recognize that subsidiaries are highly heterogeneous units in terms of their 
functions, scope of responsibilities, power relations with parent companies, 
industrial specificities, and so on. The identification of prospective companies for 
policy intervention is followed by efforts to gain audiences with decision-makers 
in these companies but, in the words of Loewendahl (2001: 22), “approaching 
companies should not be seen as a methodical exercise: it is not about one-off 
approaches to a fixed number of companies each day, but rather a market intelligence 
gathering and relationship building campaign”. The development of formal and 
informal contacts between subsidiary executives and national investment promotion 
agency officers may help identify new ways in which host country authorities might 
assist subsidiaries in their upgrading efforts. 
IPAs hold a unique insight into the problems investors face and their 
impressions of the country as an investment location, based on which they 
should draw attention to different agents of the national government and firms 
to areas that are important for making a location more attractive for knowledge-
intensive investments. To be effective in their policy advocacy role, IPAs need to 
develop strong links with other government ministries and agencies, in addition 
to the local managers of foreign multinationals and business and professional 
associations. In particular, as we argued earlier, a closer interplay is needed 
between IPAs and R&D funding bodies, universities, ministries of science, etc. 
Moreover, beyond policy advocacy and networking, some IPAs may also decide 
to become directly involved in the implementation of innovation policy, for 
example by developing new science and technology infrastructure to be able 
to attract and embed higher quality FDI, as illustrated by the case of Ireland’s 
National Institute of Bioprocessing Research and Training (Box 3).
Box 3: The Case of Ireland’s NIBRT 
In 2005, the Irish investment promotion agency, IDA Ireland, dedicated 70 million 
euro to the creation of the National Institute of Bioprocessing Research and Training 
(NIBRT), its most costly project of that year. IDA Ireland saw bioprocessing as a 
strategic industry where existing MNC subsidiaries had the potential to upgrade their 
R&D activity, and saw the necessity to create this research and training centre in order 
to stimulate the upgrading process. This is a rare role for an investment promotion 
agency and a manifestation of how FDI policies and innovation policies become more 
closely interconnected when the focus is on attracting high quality FDI.
Sources: http://www.nibrt.ie and personal interview with executives of IDA Ireland (Dublin, 
2007).
4.4 Discussion
The notion of intellectual capital represents a useful tool for analyzing the 
strategic challenges of IPAs in a structured manner, but further work remains 
to be done in order to better address the specific indicators needed, priority 
actions, management practices, etc. We have argued that the shift from a focus 
on quantity and attraction toward a focus on quality and subsidiary development 
needs to be accompanied by changes in the intellectual capital of IPAs, as 
summarized in Table 3. Although the classification into three types of intellectual 
capital is useful for analytical purposes, in practice they are closely connected 
with each other and often hard to differentiate. For example, the knowledge 
of an employee (human capital) might turn into structural capital when it is 
codified and diffused throughout the organization, and it might also turn into 
relational capital when it is used to improve relationships with stakeholders. 
This kind of transformation and combination of different types of intellectual 
capital is a critical driver of successful organizational change.
Table 3: Management Challenges for IPAs: An Intellectual Capital Perspective
Human capital - Building new skills and capabilities in existing employees
- Hiring new employees with technological and scientific 
backgrounds
Structural capital - Developing new targeting tools and checklists
- Developing and standardizing new services
- More flexible and customized forms of intervention
- New performance measurement and evaluation systems
Structural capital
Relational capital
- Stronger emphasis on subsidiary development
- Closer interaction with other spheres of government
Source: Authors
Success in adapting to these strategic challenges is driven by IPA’s 
dynamic capabilities, a term defined by Teece et al. (1997: 516) as the “ability 
to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address 
rapidly changing environments”. Needless to say, there is a wide heterogeneity 
of IPAs and each will face its specific institutional constraints and opportunities 
for reform.  In any case, a prerequisite for successful investment promotion 
is that it takes place in the context of a broader strategy for improving the 
investment environment, across a wide range of policy areas. In order to achieve 
selected policy options efficiently, clear strategic plans and policy mixes need 
to be set out (OECD, 2006). Successful promotion is expensive and resources 
need to be used wisely. 
5. Conclusion
This paper has developed a new conceptual approach to analyzing FDI policies 
and the management of IPAs. We have argued that the policy initiatives and 
services provided by IPAs are being extended from facilitation of the maximum 
initial investments toward nurturing the qualitative evolution of established 
subsidiaries. The kinds of policies appropriate for maximizing the quantity 
of FDI are different from those required to raise its quality. But the adoption 
of the qualitative approach to FDI promotion is associated with a number 
of challenges for IPAs, as it involves rethinking of existing strategies and 
significant organizational changes. We have discussed the strategic challenges 
that IPAs face in the transition from quantity to quality building upon an 
intellectual capital framework. Presently, the performance of most IPAs is still 
normally measured primarily by traditional indicators such as the amount of 
FDI attracted (the volume of investment) and the total number of jobs created. 
However, a new system of indicators is necessary to evaluate the success of IPAs 
targeting quality. The strategic reorientation needed to face these challenges 
will differ significantly across countries, but the present study can still be taken 
as a broad framework to guide and evaluate such efforts.
Note
* Thanks are due to Rajneesh Narula for useful comments to an earlier draft.
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